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Moving Beyond “China in Africa”:
Insights from Zambian Immigration Data 
Hannah POSTEL 
Abstract: China’s growing presence in Africa is not news: the expan-
sion of bilateral trade and investment ties has garnered intense media 
and political focus over the past decade. However, less is known 
about the people accompanying these increasingly intensive flows of 
goods and capital. This paper focuses on Zambia, drawing on mul-
tiple primary datasets to shed light on both the scale and nature of 
Chinese migration to the continent. Two years of Department of 
Immigration employment-permit data serve as the basis for the first 
quantitative analysis of the “Chinese” in “Africa,” illuminating the 
increasing diversity of this population flow. While the growing Chi-
nese presence in Africa is often viewed as a coherent neocolonialist 
strategy planned and implemented by the Chinese state, this paper 
demonstrates that it is in fact typified by a multitude of both public 
and private actors with independent motives.  
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Introduction 
The growth of Chinese communities in Africa has become a high-pro-
file trend, attracting global journalistic and political attention. How-
ever, the size of these migration flows is still unknown. The lack of 
any respectable quantitative estimates both impedes rigorous analysis 
and enables wildly speculative estimates to fill these gaps. Such claims 
have sparked political tensions and contributed to the pervasive yet 
unsubstantiated view that China is building a new empire in Africa 
(see French 2014). Zambia is perhaps the most (in)famous example, 
where late Zambian president Michael Sata’s alarmist claims that 
80,000 Chinese residents were “infesting” the country contributed to 
a xenophobic political campaign and at times violent racial tensions 
on Chinese-run worksites.  
This paper1 draws on multiple primary data sources to construct 
a more accurate quantitative estimate of the size of the Chinese popu-
lation in Zambia. Most existing estimates of overall migration trends 
are approximate or purely qualitative. Moreover, these figures exist 
mainly in aggregate: exact numbers for specific African countries 
have remained even more elusive. Though unreliable statistics and 
fluid migration patterns make accurate estimates difficult, this paper 
develops a novel approximation methodology involving intensive 
data and metadata analysis. Unpublished quantitative data on more 
than 25,000 immigration permits, in addition to unpublished census 
details and total immigration figures, are supplemented by in-depth 
interviews with Zambian government officials, Chinese government 
and industry representatives, and international organisation staff. A 

1 Research for this paper was conducted during the author’s William J. Fulbright 
research fellowship in Zambia from 2013–2014, supported by the Institute for 
International Education/U.S. State Department as well as the Eunice Kennedy 
Shriver National Institute of Child Health & Human Development of the Na-
tional Institutes of Health under Award Number P2CHD047879. The content 
is solely the responsibility of the author and does not necessarily represent the 
official views of the National Institutes of Health. The author thanks Solange 
Guo Chatelard, Yoon Jung Park, Zara Rabinovitch, Zander Rounds, and two 
anonymous reviewers for valuable input and feedback. A prior version of this 
paper was presented at the Determinants of International Migration Confer-
ence at the University of Oxford International Migration Institute in September 
2014, a Rohatyn Center of International Affairs lecture at Middlebury College 
in January 2015, and the London School of Economics and Political Science 
Africa Summit in April 2016. 
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best-faith estimate incorporating these data and local contextual fac-
tors indicates that the Chinese population in Zambia could range 
from a likely 13,000 people to a maximum of 22,000, far below the 
80,000 to 100,000 number most frequently cited. 
The detailed immigration permit data gathered can also provide 
insight into migrant characteristics. Through analysis of Chinese la-
bour migrants’ employers and position titles, this paper lends quanti-
tative backing to existing ethnographic analyses. While the growing 
Chinese presence in Africa is often viewed as a coherent neocolonial-
ist strategy fully planned and implemented by the Chinese state, it is 
in fact typified by a multitude of both public and private actors with 
independent motives. A quantitative analysis of recent employment 
permit trends helps to disaggregate the “Chinese” in “Africa,” making 
evident the increasing diversity of these population flows. Though 
this paper focuses solely on Zambia, similar methodologies could be 
applied in other contexts to quantify and describe migrant communi-
ties.   
Chinese Emigration to Africa 
Emigration from China has increased dramatically over the past quar-
ter century: from around 4.1 million Chinese living overseas in 1990 
to 9.3 million in 2013 (an approximately 130 per cent increase) (Wang 
2014). This paper focuses exclusively on Chinese (PRC) nationals 
living abroad rather than the broader category of ethnic Chinese 
overseas. Changes in Chinese emigration law in the latter half of the 
twenty-first century facilitated this increased outward movement: 
Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 Reform and Openness policy liberalising emi-
gration controls was followed by the 1985 “neutralisation” of emigra-
tion legislation, “seeking to disentangle outward movement from 
geopolitical and ideological concerns” (Mohan et al. 2014: 43). In 
addition, China’s bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
necessitated reform of the country’s entry-and-exit procedures; sim-
plification of the passport application process enabled more Chinese 
nationals to travel and move abroad. 
Ma Mung (2008) situates increased Chinese labour migration as 
part of a global movement, mirroring the intensification of consumer 
goods production in China. The growth of Chinese worker popula-
tions overseas is also inextricably linked with outward-facing trade 
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and investment policies. The Going Out policy of 1999 leveraged 
incentives and financial support to encourage companies to “go glo-
bal” and invest overseas. As more Chinese businesses have begun to 
operate abroad, the accompanying flows of labour migrants have also 
increased. 
While overseas Chinese communities have existed for centuries, 
historically they have been largely centred either in close proximity to 
China (i.e. Southeast Asia) or in traditional migration destinations (i.e. 
Europe, the United States). Mohan et al. (2014) note that over the 
past decades Chinese population flows have increasingly shifted to 
global resource frontiers. Chinese migration to Africa has emerged as 
a particularly notable new trend. Though small numbers of Chinese 
citizens had moved to South Africa and French colonies in the twen-
tieth century, these populations did not grow considerably until the 
1980s, when Chinese state-owned companies (SOEs) began to use 
international cooperation projects as a stepping stone into African 
markets (Kernen and Lam 2014). SOEs, state-backed projects, and 
bilateral cooperation programmes have been long-standing key drivers 
of Chinese migration to Africa. The aforementioned Going Out pol-
icy included many incentivised contracts with African governments, 
further encouraging overseas expansion and labour migration to the 
continent (Mohan et al. 2014). The rapid increase in Chinese migra-
tion to Africa over the past decade coincide not only with China’s 
increased FDI but also with China’s trade with various African coun-
tries (Mohan 2013). The first Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in 
2000 encouraged both state and private Chinese actors to engage 
more intensively in Africa with regard to all three factors of produc-
tion (capital, goods, and labour). The number of small-scale, inde-
pendent entrepreneurial establishments – including shops, restau-
rants, other retail ventures, and small factories – has also increased 
over the past few years. Chinese migration to Africa therefore sup-
ports the hypothesis that “migrations are not an isolated phenom-
enon: movements of commodities and capital almost always give rise 
to movements of people” (Castles and Miller 2009: 4). 
A Chinese Empire? Quantitative Considerations 
While it is clear that the numbers of Chinese migrants in Africa have 
increased, especially over the last decade, approximations of this 
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growth have been ad hoc and immensely variable. Experts agree that 
estimates of the Chinese population in Africa have been anything 
from “speculative” to “very problematic” (Mohan and Tan-Mullins 
2009: 601; Mohan 2013: 292). Discrepancies among suggested growth 
for a single country can range from 100 per cent to over 400 per cent 
(Ma Mung 2008). Solid empirical estimates are difficult to produce, 
for the following reasons.  
First, accurate migration data are notoriously elusive across the 
board. The United Nations acknowledges that “in many countries, 
even the most general statistics on migration are incomplete, out-of-
date or do not exist” (United Nations Economic Commission 2011: 
4). This lack of data is due to multiple challenges including data avail-
ability, definitional complexities, and changing national borders. 
Though intensive work in recent years has yielded improvements, the 
most comprehensive migration databases still provide data in 10-year 
increments only, and depend almost entirely upon the quality of re-
porting-country data. 
It is therefore worrisome that African countries often lack the 
necessary infrastructure to produce high-quality statistics – the sec-
ond major data issue. The weakness of basic data building blocks is 
made clear by the “instability of even headline economic statistics like 
growth and poverty” (Center for Global Development 2014: xi). For 
example, solely adjusting the base year for Nigeria’s GDP calculations 
led to an 89 per cent jump in the figure reported (Center for Global 
Development 2014: xi). Inaccurate measurements, inconsistent mod-
elling methodologies, and missing data are major issues. This poten-
tial for internal inaccuracies is compounded in any attempt to com-
pare data across countries, since countries do not experience these 
issues uniformly. Moreover, “the lack of transparency in reporting 
and the paucity of information accompanying the datasets mean that 
data users are easily misled” (Jerven 2013: 29). Data quality often 
reflects donor funding priorities; since migration falls outside of most 
major donor aid projects, it is not surprising these statistics are not 
prioritised. Finally, even if relevant data exist, the relevant govern-
ment offices can be reluctant to communicate these figures to the 
broader public (Kernen and Lam 2014; McNamee et al. 2012). 
Third, hard data on Chinese nationals overseas has always been 
elusive. While citizens abroad are not typically required to register 
with their local embassy, some countries are more hands-on than 
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others in keeping track of their in-country nationals (such as the 
United States, which strongly encourages registration in its Smart 
Traveler Enrollment Program). China has no such programme. Chi-
nese business associations can provide lists of registered companies in 
a specific country, and estimates of total numbers of employees for 
larger companies, but again a total count (and any source on non-
labour migrants) is lacking. The concept of the “Chinese overseas” 
has additionally been very difficult to define (Poston, Mao, and Yu 
1994). The definition of the Chinese diaspora has a long history of 
complicated legal and political debate, and often includes individuals 
who would not self-define as Chinese. To date, the scholarly literature  
has either neglected the issue of data quality and therefore accept-
ed the data at face value or dismissed the data as unreliable and 
therefore irrelevant. (Jerven 2013: 110)  
Yet this need not be the case. Increased international attention to 
data collection and quality in the developing world could also be ap-
plied to population numbers. In the specific case of Chinese commu-
nities in Africa, a foundational study established the need for a more 
detailed look at existing data, and the potential of developing a more 
robust analytical framework by questioning underlying assumptions 
(Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009). This need still exists.  
The lack of reliable population numbers has enabled speculative, 
inflated estimates to exaggerate the supposed Chinese “threat” (Mo-
han and Tan-Mullins 2009). Hype and speculation run rife, encour-
aged by both local and international media attention. In actuality, the 
different forms of contemporary Chinese migration to Africa do not 
largely “differ from those of historical migrations – temporary con-
tractual, entrepreneurial and proletarian” (Ma Mung 2008: 653). Re-
gardless, the growing number of Chinese nationals in Africa has 
raised questions about the intent and outcomes of their presence, 
and encouraged fears that China is “building a new empire on the 
continent” (French 2014). These concerns have led to xenophobic 
election rhetoric, occasional outbreaks of violence, and widespread 
belief in unfounded myths such as China’s supposed export of 
prison labour. Empirically sound data establishing baseline trends 
could help to avoid these sorts of negative outcomes. 
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Estimating the Chinese Population in Zambia 
The Chinese population in Zambia is one of the most famously exag-
gerated on the continent. In his first bid for the presidency in 2006, 
late Zambian president Michael Sata leveraged an alarmist claim of 
80,000 Chinese residents to support his populist platform. Some 
researchers have since dismissed this as a xenophobic “scare num-
ber” made up for purely political purposes, instead suggesting an 
estimate somewhere between 4,000 and 15,000 (Kopinski and Polus 
2011; Yan and Sautman 2009). However, exaggerated figures of 
80,000 to 100,000 continue to appear as fact in many widely read 
publications (e.g. French 2014; Carmody, Hampwaye, and Sakala 2012; 
McNamee et al. 2012), biasing analysis of the subject. The persistence 
of this discredited number in public discourse highlights the need for 
a more credible estimate of the Chinese population in Zambia.  
Despite the data and methodological issues discussed above, it is 
possible to improve upon current estimates of Chinese populations in 
Africa. This study will draw on data from the Zambian census (2010) 
and immigration permit logs (2011, 2012) to create an estimate of the 
Chinese community at year-end 2012. Qualifying multiple datasets 
with collection methodology, other metadata, and qualitative observa-
tions yields more accurate results through more precise data use and 
in-depth understanding of the topic at hand. This mixed-methods 
approach accords with Jerven’s assertion that “quantitative analysis 
can be fruitful only if it is based in careful criticism of the source and 
is supplemented by qualitative investigation” (Jerven 2013: 35). 
To enable this analysis, the author manually transcribed details 
from more than 25,000 unpublished immigration permits. Data ac-
cess was facilitated by the Zambian Development Agency, which 
played an advisory role in the research process. Though the Depart-
ment of Immigration compiles aggregate immigration statistics that 
are readily available to researchers, anything more granular resides in 
hand-written permit log books, compiled on a weekly basis from the 
immigration desk officers (see Figure 1). There is no institutional 
arrangement to facilitate such data sharing; access was largely facili-
tated by a prominent immigration officer with an individual interest 
in understanding broader immigration trends.  
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Figure 1. Sample Immigration Permit Log 

Source:  Zambian Department of Immigration 2014. 
This exercise does not purport to yield a “correct” answer, but rather 
to set a reasonable, facts-based baseline for future reference and ana-
lysis. For the purposes of this estimation, the Chinese migrant com-
munity is comprised of Chinese citizens (1) who reside in Zambia at 
the time of the census plus (2) those in possession of long-term (2+ 
year) permits for work and residence. Many more entry visas and 
temporary permits were granted to Chinese nationals, but due to the 
short duration of their Zambia stays these individuals are not here 
considered to be migrants. Dual citizenship was not permitted by 
either country at the time of this study.  
The most recent Zambian census was conducted in late 2010, 
and reported that 0.8 per cent of the population (100,210 people) fit 
the aggregate grouping “Major Racial Groups,” defined as “Other 
Africans, Americans, Asians, and Europeans.” In an unpublished 
report provided by the Statistics Department, the author identified 
1,007 Chinese citizens resident in Zambia in 2010. However, the 
census sampling methodology excluded most residents of “institu-
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tional” housing, a category including hotels/motels/lodges, hostels/ 
guesthouses, hospitals, learning institutes (e.g. boarding schools), pris-
ons, refugee camps, police cells, and “other” categories. Any type of 
“collective quarters” was included in this category. Each structure of 
this type was assigned a single Census Building Number, and one 
individual answered the questionnaire for all current residents. This 
methodology likely caused an overall population undercount, but 
would have disproportionately impacted the Chinese community since 
many Chinese migrants live in non-traditional dwellings (e.g. on 
worksites, in collective housing, in special economic zones, or in resi-
dences attached to their business). Experts estimate that the Chinese 
population at the time was approximately 10,000 (Chatelard 2013). 
All visitors require a visa to enter Zambia, with stays past 30 days 
requiring an additional longer-term permit. The six major permit 
types are: residence, visiting, study, employment, temporary, and self-
employment (investor). Permitted length of stay varies from three 
months to 10 years. The below estimate compiled by the author is bas-
ed on a list of unpublished total annual permit issuances from the 
Zambian Department of Immigration, including those permits with a 
duration over two years (residence, employment, and self-employment).  
In utilising these flow numbers to construct a reliable stock esti-
mate, one must take into account a number of considerations: 
 Zambia does not have a separate permit for family reunion – 
family members enter on the same permit as the initial holder. 
This complicates the collection of accurate statistics, as only the 
individual granted a permit is written into the immigration rec-
ords. For the purposes of this estimate, the raw permit count will 
be scaled by 1.5. Though only a minority of Chinese migrants to 
Zambia bring family members with them, when they do so it of-
ten involves a full extended family (two to six people). 
 Exit records are especially poor. People leaving Zambia are sup-
posed to turn in their permits and get their passport stamped 
upon exit; however, most people do not follow these require-
ments and exit stamps are recorded infrequently. This estimate 
attempts to correct for the following data biases: 
 Recorded exits include all individuals, not just those 
present on longer-term stays. The paper therefore 
scales the total number of exits by the ratio of long-
term permit holders to total entrants in each year. 
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 Exit records measure all departures from Zambia, 
regardless of whether or not one plans to return. In-
terviews with members of the Chinese community 
provided the impression that long-term residents 
tend to return to China approximately twice a year – 
more for small business owners and less for public 
works contractors. The estimation framework will 
therefore assume that one out of every three annual 
departures is final. 
 Most fundamentally, exits are severely undercounted. 
Officers at the Department of Immigration indicated 
that they normally received complete exit records 
from Kenneth Kaunda International Airport (the 
major point of departure for Chinese citizens) ap-
proximately two days of the week. The estimation 
has been scaled accordingly, though unfortunately 
there is no way to know the frequency of China-
bound flights on the days reported. 
 Renewals are counted as new permit issuances, thus overstating 
the number of new entries. The estimation reflects the qualitative 
report that approximately one in four Chinese migrants stays in 
Zambia past the duration of their current permit. 
 As reported in much of the literature on Chinese communities in 
Africa (e.g. Ma Mung 2008), overstaying visas is fairly common, 
leading to an underestimation of the true size of the population. 
This estimation builds on interviews and observation to assume 
that approximately one-third of individuals will overstay their visa. 
This is perhaps the most tenuous reach, but the analysis can be 
adjusted as better data on the subject is collected. 
Table 1. Data Considerations in Constructing an Estimate of the Chinese 
Population in Zambia 
Downward bias Upward bias 
Census Exits undercounted 
Multiple individulas on permit Renewals 
Exits count nonmigrants  
Exits count circular trips  
Visa overstay  
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Table 2. Estimation Framework for the Chinese Population in Zambia, 
End of Year 2012 
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Table 1 summarises the measurement biases this paper attempts to 
address. The first column of Table 2 provides the base values, with 
each additional column accounting for each underestimation to reach 
a maximum estimated population size of 22,744 individuals at the end 
of 2012. The following columns incorporate revised figures for up-
ward biases, reaching a most likely population size of approximately 
13,000 individuals. 
It is clear that even with imperfect data and methodology, the 
Chinese population in Zambia does not approach 80,000 people. At 
the estimated maximum value, Chinese migrants accounted for 0.15 
per cent of the 2012 Zambian population of 14.8 million people. 
Figures 2 and 3 below show how Chinese nationals account for a 
large and growing percentage of new Zambian immigration permit 
recipients. 
Figure 2. Approved Permits by Nationality 
Source: Zambian Department of Immigration 2014.   
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Figure 3. Chinese Migration to Zambia 
Source: Zambian Department of Immigration 2014. 
Quantifying Common Claims and Trends 
The author’s access to unpublished employment permit data for 2012 
and 2013 also provided insight into other characteristics of the Chi-
nese population in Zambia. The 2012 records provided information 
on the nationality, occupation, and employer of each permit holder. 
While the 2013 records did not include individual occupations, loca-
tional data was recorded for some of the permit-sponsoring employ-
ers, providing insight into patterns of residence in the country. This 
primary dataset is the first of its kind, and can be used to shed quanti-
tative light on commonly discussed trends and issues related to Chi-
nese migrant communities in Africa – specifically, migration typolo-
gies and broader implications.  
Typologies 
Chinese migration to Africa is often categorised into three different 
types: temporary labour migrants, small-scale entrepreneurs, and 
transit migrants. The first category can be divided into two sub-
groups: semi-skilled labourers who mostly return to China after com-
pleting their contracts, and a smaller group of managers and profes-
sionals often remaining in Africa as entrepreneurs. In her study of 
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Chinese activities in Zambia, Solange Guo Chatelard also includes a 
“small number of expatriates sent over by central and provincial gov-
ernment agencies to fulfill diplomatic, managerial and consultant 
functions in different sectors” (Chatelard 2011: 183). 
Quantitative evidence from Zambia largely supports these typol-
ogies. Ninety-five per cent of the Chinese entering Zambia in 2012 
(3,722 permits) were labour migrants. All but a few were employed by 
Chinese-owned companies. National or regional Chinese SOEs spon-
sored 2,026 individuals. Zambian government ministries directly 
hired 678 Chinese workers, while many more were working on Zam-
bian government contracts won by large Chinese construction com-
panies (see Table 3). One particularly telling example is the 446 indi-
viduals hired by the Zambian Ministry of Defence and Air Force. 
Though at first glance the possibility that Chinese nationals might be 
staffing Zambia’s military roster could be a cause for concern (espe-
cially given the extensive media focus on the Chinese “takeover” of 
Africa), permit details show that most if not all of these individuals 
were working to build the new Air Force barracks on a government 
contract with the Chinese construction giant Sinomach. 
These figures illustrate how crucial government contracts are to 
the flow of Chinese labour migrants to Zambia. While not a single 
Sinohydro employee entered the country in 2012, this figure jumped 
to 136 in 2013 (direct employees; 333 when contract workers on other 
projects are included). The reverse is also true: while in 2012, 200 
employees were hired by Sinomach and 446 by the contracting Minis-
try of Defence, after the project was completed the numbers dropped 
to 43 and 89, respectively, in 2013. 
The distinction between different categories of Chinese labour 
migrants to Africa also largely holds true in Zambia. A number of 
Chinese managers said that staying in Zambia would end their car-
eers, since personal connections central to successful business net-
working in China were impossible to maintain from such a distance. 
Such individuals joined those on short-term contracts returning to 
China after a few years in Zambia. Another group chose to remain to 
begin their own companies, often hiring more Chinese employees in 
turn. For example, an individual granted an investor’s permit in 2011 
to establish the company Camland Construction sponsored 11 work 
permits for Chinese migrant employees in 2013. Chinese entrepre-
neurs accounted for 237 investment permits from January 2012 to 
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June 2014. These new businesses were largely concentrated in the 
construction, manufacturing, and mining industries. 
Table 3. Zambian Employment Permits by Selected Companies,  
2012–2013 
Company Name 2012 2013 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 1,611 2,884 
China Henan International Cooperation Group 
(CHICO) 129 234 
China Nonferrous Mining & Subsidiaries (includes 
Chambishi Mine, NFC Africa, Sinometals Leach) 423 521 
Avic International (mainly road construction) 75 178 
China Geo-Engineering 152 302 
China Jiangxi Corporation for International, Economic, 
and Technical Cooperation 61 157 
Sepco Electric Power Construction 36 409 
Sinohydro 0 136 
Sinoma International Engineering 109 153 
China National Machinery Industry Corporation  
(Sinomach) 200 43 
Sogecoa (Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group 
subsidiary) 55 121 
ZTE (telecommunications) 112 46 
Chinese Private Companies 315 538 
Hua Chang Infrastructure Engineering 70 56 
Hua Jiang Investments 34 86 
Wah Kong Enterprises 49 71 
Yangts Jiang Enterprises 54 136 
Zambian Government – Direct 678 530 
Ministry of Defence 446 89 
Zesco (electricity parastatal) 81 285 
Other 1,118 1,945 
Itezhi Tezhi Power Corporation (Joint venture between 
Tata Group & Zesco implemented by Sinohydro) 23 103 
Kariba North Bank Extension Project (Zesco  
implemented by Sinohydro) 62 94 
Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone 34 55 
Total 3,722 5,897 
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The permit data could not fully identify the labour migrants in the 
“other” category above, though it is likely that most of these individ-
uals work for small Chinese-owned businesses (typically restaurants, 
import-export shops, and spin-off construction companies). It is 
impossible to determine the exact nature of many of these enterprises 
due to data imprecision and the disputed, highly variant role of state 
influence on Chinese businesses – even those that are privately 
owned. After joint ventures and third-country corporations large 
enough to individually identify are accounted for, it is possible to 
state that perhaps 60 per cent of the remaining Chinese individuals 
on work permits were in Zambia to support private businesses.  
Chinese transit migrants are likely very limited. It is impossible to 
estimate the number due precisely to their transient nature and poor 
immigrant exit records, but a large majority of the Chinese communi-
ty as observed and self-described planned either to remain in Zambia 
or to return to China in the medium term rather than move to a third 
country. This information is perhaps better captured in original entry 
visa data, as individuals looking to move onwards would have no 
reason to pursue long-term residence in Zambia. A similar lack of 
data applies for irregular migration, likely due to a lack of bureaucratic 
and enforcement capacity in the Zambian government. 
Descriptive Implications 
Employment data on Chinese nationals in Zambia illuminate the 
economic and social role these individuals play in-country. Many 
aspiring Chinese migrants fit Zambian immigration policy aims of 
admitting highly educated, investment-seeking foreigners to combat 
the local skills gap. This is demonstrated by extremely high admission 
rates: less than 1 per cent of Chinese work permit applicants were 
rejected in 2012. Coding for terms such as “manager,” “director,” and 
“senior” resulted in the identification of 2,754 permit holders in man-
agerial occupations. Chinese nationals accounted for 923 of these 
managerial permits, entering Zambia to play a supervisory role. 
The Chinese population in Zambia shows that emigration from 
China is increasingly geographically diverse, with increasing represen-
tation from central and northern China. Though a departure from the 
traditional demographics (in the twentieth century Chinese emigrants 
largely came from coastal regions such as Guangdong, Zhejiang, and 
Fujian), this can be largely explained by the employment-driven na-
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ture of Chinese migration. Most large companies hire workers from 
their home regions – for example, the Chengdu-based Lusaka Pan 
Brick Company hires workers from its home province of Sichuan. 
The increasing number of migrants from poorer, inland provinces 
also highlights the juxtaposition between the career opportunities 
available to this demographic in China versus in Africa (Kernen and 
Lam 2014). 
Though outsiders often refer to “the Chinese” as a homogenous 
group, the Chinese population in Zambia is relatively disjointed. Mul-
tiple long-term residents described how the community has splintered 
as numbers have grown. In the 1990s, the approximately 200 Chinese 
residents of Lusaka all knew each other and united around their 
shared identity. As the Chinese migrant population has grown and 
diversified, individuals now self-segregate into smaller groups, based 
on region of origin, gender, or occupation, as illustrated by the ex-
panding numbers of Chinese community organisations. Twenty years 
ago only the Chinese Embassy existed; by contrast, two new regional 
migrant associations were created in 2014 alone. The growing popula-
tion is linked to more intense competition within the Chinese com-
munity, with an increasing number of Chinese companies competing 
for market access and project bids. 
This diversity is also politically significant, as Chatelard asserts:  
Individuals and families have their own agenda which is often 
quite separate from the concerns of the Chinese government […] 
it is not a homogeneous community of agents collectively working 
to forward a coherent government agenda. (Chatelard 2011: 187) 
Chinese government representatives freely admit to maintaining con-
tact almost exclusively with the Chinese employees of large state-
owned enterprises seeking Zambian government contracts, and rare-
ly, if ever, interacting with the sizeable group of individuals pursuing 
private interests. In fact, they reported they are unable to even esti-
mate the size of the Chinese community. The “inability or unwilling-
ness of the Chinese state to support and care for [Chinese migrants 
not associated with the state] in times of difficulty” has been a cause 
of tension in various Chinese communities in Africa (Xiao 2015: 84). 
The growing Chinese presence in Africa continues to set off 
global alarm bells, as it is often viewed as a coherent neocolonialist 
strategy fully planned and implemented by the Chinese state. In ac-
tuality, this new Chinese migration is typified by a multitude of both 
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public and private actors with independent motives, similarly to other 
global population flows. However, it is important to keep in mind 
that at least to some degree, these smaller-scale, independent opera-
tions do still depend on “clement macro-relations” between China 
and the host country (Xiao 2015: 84). 
Conclusion 
Chinese migration to Zambia (and Africa more broadly) will likely 
continue to increase over the short-to-medium term. China’s popula-
tion pressures and recent international business expansions are driv-
ing this trend. Chinese emigration has historically followed a chain 
migration pattern, with pioneer migrants creating opportunities in the 
destination country for friends and family to follow behind. The Chi-
nese population in Zambia is still quite new; as life in Zambia is pub-
licised and further business opportunities are created, more migrants 
will likely follow. It is important to keep scale in mind; however, other 
factors also play a role in how Chinese migration to Zambia is per-
ceived. Chinese migrant communities are quite new and expanding 
quickly, have a disproportionate economic impact for their size, and 
are highly visible for multiple reasons. 
This paper has leveraged primary data from Zambia to paint a 
more accurate and nuanced picture of the local Chinese community. 
As Mohan et al. state, there is a need to better understand “the na-
ture, activities, and impacts of the expanding and more diverse expatri-
ate communities that are being produced on the continent” (Mohan 
et al. 2014: 158). This cannot be done without better, fact-based 
comprehension of the scale of Chinese migration to Africa. While 
better administrative and census data will be most helpful to this 
venture in the long term, in-depth analyses of receiving countries’ 
immigration and statistics systems will be an improvement over the 
current state of knowledge.  
The approximation methodology developed in this paper has po-
tential to be leveraged and/or modified for other settings. Where 
available, administrative data provide much more granular insight into 
migration trends than aggregate sums. Bringing local context to bear 
on widely published figures (e.g. national census data) is central to 
conducting consistent, informed analyses. Future research could bet-
ter inform the assumptions underlying the estimation framework, 
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specifically in regard to visa overstay and circular migration. Applying 
this estimation methodology to other African countries would yield 
insight into whether the total Chinese population on the continent is 
similarly overstated. Statistics are political: improved data and ana-
lyses can paint a more accurate and nuanced picture of local Chinese 
communities and help to contain detrimental political rhetoric.    
References 
Carmody, Pádraig, Godfrey Hampwaye, and Enock Sakala (2012), 
Globalisation and the Rise of the State? Chinese Geogovernance 
in Zambia, in: New Political Economy, 17, 2, 209–229. 
Castles, Stephen, and Mark Miller (2009), The Age of Migration, Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Center for Global Development (2014), Delivering on the Data Revolu-
tion in Sub-Saharan Africa: Final Report of the Data for African Devel-
opment Working Group, Washington, DC: Center for Global De-
velopment.  
Central Statistical Office of Zambia (2013), Unpublished Census Data, 
Lusaka: Central Statistical Office. 
Chatelard, Solange (2013), Personal Communication, 3 November. 
Chatelard, Solange (2011), Unpacking the New “Scramble for Afri-
ca”: A Critical and Local Perspective of Chinese Activities in 
Zambia, in: Andreas Vasilache, Reimund Seidelmann, and Jose 
Luis de Sales Marques (eds), States, Regions and the Global System: 
Europe and Northern Asia-Pacific in Globalized Governance, Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 175–197. 
French, Howard (2014), China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants 
are Building a New Empire in Africa, New York, NY: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 
Jerven, Morten (2013), Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African 
Development Statistics and What to Do About It, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Kernen, Antoine, and Katy Lam (2014), Workforce Localization 
among Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Ghana, in: 
Journal of Contemporary China, 23, 90, 1053–1072. 
Kopinski, Dominik, and Andrzej Polus (2011), Sino-Zambian Rela-
tions: ‘An All-Weather Friendship’ Weathering the Storm, in: 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29, 2, 181–192. 
  174 Hannah Postel 

Ma Mung, Emmanuel (2008), Chinese Migration and China’s Foreign 
Policy in Africa, in: Journal of Chinese Overseas, 4, 1, 91–109. 
McNamee, Terence, Greg Mills, Sebabatso Manoeli, Masana Mu-
laudzi, Stuart Doran, and Emma Chen (2012), Africa in Their Own 
Words: Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, 
Zambia and Angola, Discussion Paper, 3, Johannesburg: The 
Brenthurst Foundation.  
Mohan, Giles (2013), Migrants as Agents of South-South Coopera-
tion: The Case of Chinese in Africa, in: Justin Dargin (ed.), The 
Rise of the Global South: Philosophical, Geopolitical, and Economic Trends 
of the 21st Century, London: World Scientific Publications, 283–
322. 
Mohan, Giles, and May Tan-Mullins (2009), Chinese Migrants in 
Africa as New Agents of Development? An Analytical Frame-
work, in: European Journal of Development Research, 21, 4, 588–605. 
Mohan, Giles, Ben Lampert, May Tan-Mullins, and Daphne Chang 
(2014), Chinese Migrants and Africa’s Development: New Imperialists or 
Agents of Change?, London: Zed Books. 
Poston, Dudley, Michael Mao, and Mei-Yu Yu (1994), The Global 
Distribution of the Overseas Chinese Around 1990, in: Popula-
tion and Development Review, 20, 3, 631–645. 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations 
Population Fund (2011), Statistics on International Migration: A Prac-
tical Guide for Countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Geneva: 
United Nations.  
Wang, Huiyao (2014), Recent Trends in Migration between China and Other 
Developing Countries, Presentation at the International Organiza-
tion for Migration, South-South Migration: Partnering Strategi-
cally for Development conference, Geneva, 24–25 March. 
Xiao, Allen Hai (2015), In the Shadow of the States: The Informali-
ties of Chinese Petty Entrepreneurship in Nigeria, in: Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs, 44, 1, 75–105, online: <https://journals. 
sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/view/816/817> (31 July 
2017). 
Yan, Hairong, and Barry Sautman (2009), Chinese Activities: More 
than Just Mining, in: The China Monitor, 44, 4–6. 
Zambian Department of Immigration (2014), Immigration Permit De-
tails, Lusaka: Department of Immigration. 
  Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 2/2017:  1 
Contents
Editorial 
       Kerry BROWN and Georg STRÜVER 
Editorial 3
Research Articles 
      Julia Kirch KIRKEGAARD 
Tackling Chinese Upgrading Through 
Experimentalism and Pragmatism:  
The Case of China’s Wind Turbine Industry 7
      Peter KNAACK 
An Unlikely Champion of Global Finance: Why Is 
China Exceeding International Banking Standards? 41
       Ane BISLEV 
Student-to-Student Diplomacy:  
Chinese International Students as a Soft-Power Tool 81
       Camilla T. N. SØRENSEN 
Constraints on the Soft Power Efforts of Authoritarian 
States: The Case of the 2015 Military Parade in Beijing 111
Analyses
      Karin BUHMANN 
Chinese Human Rights Guidance on Minerals  
Sourcing: Building Soft Power 135
      Hannah POSTEL 
Moving Beyond “China in Africa”:  
Insights from Zambian Immigration Data 155
Contributors 175
 
